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The shadow of the future 
promotes cooperation in a 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma for 
children
Peter R. Blake1, David G. Rand2, Dustin Tingley3 & Felix Warneken4
Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals can be supported by direct reciprocity. 
Theoretical models and experiments with adults show that the possibility of future interactions with 
the same partner can promote cooperation via conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit-for-tat 
(TFT). Here, we introduce a novel implementation of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) designed 
for children to examine whether repeated interactions can successfully promote cooperation in 10 
and 11 year olds. We find that children cooperate substantially more in repeated PDs than in one-
shot PDs. We also find that girls cooperate more than boys, and that children with more conduct 
problems cooperate less. Finally, we find that children use conditional cooperation strategies but 
that these strategies vary by gender and conduct problem rating. Specifically, girls and children 
with few conduct problems appear to follow an altruistic version of win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS), 
attempting to re-establish cooperation after they had defected. Boys and children with more conduct 
problems appear to follow a Grim strategy, defecting for the duration after the partner defects. Thus 
we provide evidence that children utilize the power of direct reciprocity to promote cooperation 
in strategic interactions and that, by late elementary school, distinct strategies of conditional 
cooperation have emerged.
Cooperation is a central feature of human societies but is a challenge because it requires individuals to 
pay costs to benefit others. Direct reciprocity is one mechanism that can support cooperation between 
genetically unrelated individuals: when people interact repeatedly, it can be worth paying the cost of 
cooperation today in order to gain reciprocal cooperation from one’s partner tomorrow1–3. The role of 
direct reciprocity has been studied extensively in adults using the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD), a 
standard paradigm for exploring human cooperation4. In a typical PD, pairs of individuals simultane-
ously decide whether to cooperate or defect and payoffs are determined by their combined decisions. 
When both parties cooperate, they maximize their combined payoff. But each individual has an incentive 
to defect and achieve a higher individual payoff, leaving their cooperating partner with the lowest payoff. 
When partners will only interact once, the temptation to defect makes defection the dominant strategy 
for both parties and results in a lower combined payoff.
Direct reciprocity provides one solution to the problem of defection in the PD. In one-shot PDs, 
pairs interact only once and reciprocity is not possible. However, when pairs engage in repeated interac-
tions, reciprocal strategies can lead to increased cooperation: if your partner’s cooperation in the future 
rounds is contingent on you cooperating today, even selfish people may cooperate (given a large enough 
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probability of future interaction)5,6. Experimental comparisons of anonymous adults playing PDs with 
different time horizons have shown that, for the same payoff matrix, people cooperate more in games 
with a higher potential for future interactions with the same partner4,7. Analyses of strategies used in 
repeated PDs show that most adults either use a conditional strategy of tit-for-tat (TFT) or simply always 
defect (ALLD)8. The “shadow of the future” thus can promote cooperation via conditional play, even 
when players remain anonymous to each other.
While the repeated PD has been used extensively in experiments with adults7–13, and children’s play 
in other economic games has been explored in recent years14–24, repeated PD experiments with children 
remain rare. Most importantly, direct comparisons of children’s play in PDs of different lengths are 
lacking. (The few prior studies which have examined play in repeated PDs have not compared play to 
games of different lengths25, and have either been non-anonymous26,27 or involved more than 2 players28; 
in the latter case, cooperation is not expected to succeed even in the presence of repeated interactions). 
In the current experiment, we compared children’s play in a fixed-length repeated PD to play in a series 
of one-shot PDs. In the repeated PD, children were paired with an anonymous partner for six rounds, 
and in the one-shot PD, children were randomly re-matched with a new anonymous partner after each 
round and the history of the partner’s prior decisions were not given. The key difference between these 
two conditions is that direct reciprocity is possible in the repeated game but not in the one-shot games. 
Thus, comparing play in one-shot versus repeated PDs can reveal whether children recognize the poten-
tial for direct reciprocity in repeated games and whether they use strategies of conditional cooperation 
to encourage future cooperation.
One barrier to the use of repeated PDs with children is the difficulty of explaining and presenting the 
decision problem they will face. To make the PD payoff structure more intuitive, we designed a novel, 
graphical interface to present the prisoner’s dilemma (Fig. 1). We tested pre-adolescent children (mean 
age 11.6 years; N = 64; 44 females) in the 5th and 6th grade of an elementary school in the US (the gender 
imbalance reflected the male/female ratios in the classes). Classrooms were assigned to play a series of 
either one-shot or repeated PDs (1,790 total decisions). In order to isolate the role of direct reciprocity 
in children’s strategic decisions, we maintained anonymity between partners and compared one-shot and 
repeated PDs.
We were also interested in whether children’s individual characteristics or traits influenced their deci-
sions in the PD. For example, in some PDs girls cooperate more than boys29 but other studies have 
found no differences28. Recent research has also demonstrated that children with behavioral problems 
approach strategic games differently30,31. Problems such as conduct disorder typically appear in late ele-
mentary school and can persist into adulthood32. To explore the possibility that behavioral issues might 
Figure 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma interface. Two players face each other on screen, actor on bottom, and can 
either push or pull their tray by clicking buttons for these options. Pushing the tray delivers three coins 
to the partner and causes one coin to fall into an abyss. Pulling the tray delivers one coin to the actor and 
causes the three far coins to fall into the abyss. Panels a-c show the sequence of play from the (a) starting 
position, (b) the result of both players choosing push (CC), and (c) the payoffs to both players shown in the 
right side history bar. Panel (d) shows the result of the actor pulling and the partner pushing (DC).
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influence children’s decisions, we asked parents to complete the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire 
(SDQ)33,34, a measure widely used to assess children’s behavioral problems on five dimensions: Prosocial 
Behavior, Conduct Problems, Emotional Problems, Hyperactivity and Peer Problems35 (see Table S1 for 
full questionnaire).
Results
We first examined the overall effect of direct reciprocity by comparing the probability of cooperation in 
the one shot and repeated games. We used logistic regression models with clustered standard errors at the 
level of the individual and the pair (Stata v.13.1). No grade differences were found and thus both grades 
were combined for analysis. Children cooperated more in the repeated compared to the one-shot PD 
(coeff = 0.563, p = 0.013), an effect that also held when examining only the first round of play for each 
type of game (coeff = 1.216, p = 0.023) (Fig. 2). Regressions including trial number found that cooper-
ation declined over the course of the session (coeff = − 0.041, p < 0.001) in both repeated and one-shot 
games (no interaction between decision number and repeated-game dummy: coeff = 0.011, p = 0.406), 
but that cooperation remained higher in the repeated games (coeff = 0.675, p = 0.003) when controlling 
for trial number (Figure S1). These results demonstrate a “shadow of the future” effect in school-aged 
children. Children recognized the strategic difference between one shot and repeated PDs, even in the 
first round of play, and responded to the incentives created by direct reciprocity in the repeated game.
We next ran a regression adding gender and the five SDQ variables (and including a Bonferonni cor-
rection for 6 multiple comparisons). Results showed that boys cooperated less than girls (coeff = − 0.941, 
p = 0.002 corrected), and that children rated higher on Conduct Problems tended to cooperate 
less (coeff = − 0.278, p = 0.012 corrected) (Fig.  3); all other SDQ measures were non-significant 
(p > 0.10 corrected). A regression including interactions between a repeated-game dummy and each 
individual-difference measure found no significant interactions (all ps > 0.20), indicating that the gender 
and Conduct Problem effects applied to both one-shot and repeated games. To interpret these coefficients, 
Figure 2. Direct reciprocity promotes cooperation in school-aged children. Shown is the frequency of 
cooperation in all rounds of the 1-shot versus repeated games and in the first round of play only. Error bars 
indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 3. Boys and those with conduct problems cooperate less in the PD. Shown is the frequency of 
cooperation across all games for (a) girl and boys and (b) by Conduct Problems, with High representing 
children rated in the abnormal range of the scale and Low representing children in the typical range of the 
scale. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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we calculated the odds ratios for gender and conduct (see supplement for details). Girls were almost 2.5 
times more likely to cooperate than boys and a one point increase in conduct problems score predicted 
a 15% decrease in cooperation.
Finally, we performed a more detailed analysis of children’s strategies in the repeated games. Given 
that children were aware that each repeated game lasted six rounds, they may have engaged in a process 
of backwards induction36,37, switching from cooperation to defection as the end of each repeated game 
approached. We did not find evidence of this strategy: cooperation was not significantly lower in the 
last round compared to the second-to-last round (coeff = − 0.110, p = 0.362), nor was there a significant 
decrease in cooperation over rounds when considering rounds 2–6 within each game (coeff = − 0.008, 
p = 0.868). Thus, although cooperation in the repeated games classrooms decreased over the course of 
the entire testing session, children did not appear to decrease their cooperation in the later rounds of 
each separate game. Although end-game effects have been found for adults playing repeated games, chil-
dren may not have engaged in the more sophisticated form of strategic thinking required for backwards 
induction38.
Instead, we found evidence that children were using conditional strategies (Fig. 4). They were signif-
icantly more likely to cooperate when their partner cooperated in the previous round (44.9% C) than 
when their partner defected in the previous round (27.4% C) (coeff = 0.772, p < 0.001). An interaction 
between the player’s own previous move and the partner’s previous move was significant (coeff = 2.033, 
p < 0.009) and offers further insights into the strategies children used. When children had cooperated 
in the previous round, cooperation was contingent on the partner’s previous move (52.8% C in response 
to partner’s C, 11.1% C in response to partner’s D; coeff = 2.192, p = 0.001). Thus, mutual cooperation 
in the prior round encouraged continued cooperation, whereas being exploited (child C, partner D) in 
the prior round evoked defection. When children themselves had defected in the previous round, the 
partner’s decision did not produce this effect; rather, children showed an intermediate level of coopera-
tion (38.9% C in response to partner’s C, 35.2% C in response to partner’s D; coeff = 0.158, p = 0.427). 
Interestingly, this pattern means that after mutual defection children were more likely to return to coop-
eration (35.2%) than when they had been exploited in the prior round (11.1%). In sum, when direct 
reciprocity was possible, children relied on conditional strategies to a substantial degree.
Conditional cooperation also varied by individual characteristics of the children. One factor was the 
child’s gender (Fig.  5a). Both girls and boys responded to mutual cooperation with cooperation, but 
tended to defect after they had cooperated and the partner defected (i.e. after they had been exploited; 
child C, partner D). However, differences emerged when the children themselves had defected in the 
prior round. After mutual defection, girls were more likely to cooperate than boys (girls, 44.5% C; boys, 
24.6% C; coeff = − 0.901, p = 0.019) . In addition, after the child had defected and the partner cooper-
ated (child D, partner C), earning the child the highest payout, girls were again more likely to cooperate 
than boys (girls, 46.3%; boys, 24.1%; coeff = − 1.000, p = 0.028). Thus, although girls tended to cooperate 
more than boys overall, this difference was driven mostly by cooperation after the actor’s own defection.
A child’s level of conduct problems was also important for conditional strategies (Fig. 5b). We created 
conduct problems subgroups by separating children with scores in the “abnormal” range of the scale into 
a High Conduct Problems group (N = 3) and children with lower (typical) scores into a Low Conduct 
Problems group (N = 27). The proportion of children in the High Conduct Problems group (10%) 
matches that expected for a community sample34, however, all of the children in this group in the cur-
rent study were girls. The results comparing the two conduct problems groups mirrored the pattern seen 
for girls and boys. Children in both the Low and High conduct problems groups responded to mutual 
cooperation with cooperation and defected after they had cooperated and the partner defected (child 
C, partner D). Differences emerged between these groups when the children themselves had defected 
in the prior round. Children with Low conduct problems were more likely to cooperate than children 
with High conduct problems after mutual defection, although this difference was not significant (33.4%, 
Low; 23.1% High; coeff = − 0.516, p = 0.263). However, when children had defected and the partner had 
Figure 4. Children use conditional cooperation strategies in repeated games. Shown is the frequency of 
cooperation in repeated games as a function of the partner’s move in the previous round and the actor’s own 
move in the previous round. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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cooperated in the prior round (child D, partner C), children with Low conduct problems were marginally 
more likely to cooperate (38.7%, Low; 15%, High; coeff = − 1.275, p = 0.051). Thus, children who scored 
in the abnormal range for conduct problems (High) were less likely to try to re-establish cooperation 
after they themselves had defected.
Interestingly, the decisions made in the repeated game by boys and by children with high conduct 
problems resembled a strategy known as Grim, which is less forgiving than TFT: Grim cooperates until 
the partner defects, and then defects forever4. Therefore, unlike TFT, Grim does not cooperate after child 
D, partner C. Girls and children with low conduct problems, on the other hand, employed a strategy that 
resembled a combination of TFT and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS)39. WSLS performs well in repeated 
games where errors are possible39, but is rarely found in adult versions of the PD4,8,11. When using WSLS, 
players stay with their previous decision when it has produced a high payoff for themselves. Thus actors 
continue to cooperate after mutual cooperation (CC) and continue to defect after they defect and the 
partner cooperates (DC). In contrast, after losing decisions, actors shift to the opposite move: they switch 
to defection after they have been exploited (CD) and switch to cooperation after mutual defection (DD). 
Girls and children with low conduct problems appeared to follow WSLS except in the case of DC, when 
they received the highest payoff. After DC, these children returned to cooperation to a high degree, 
perhaps reflecting a more altruistic version of win-stay, lose-shift. In sum, children’s individual character-
istics proved an important factor in determining the conditional strategies they used in the repeated PD.
Discussion
This study provides the first evidence that direct reciprocity promotes cooperation among children 
engaged in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, leading to more cooperation when future interactions are pos-
sible compared to when they are not. Increased cooperation in the repeated relative to the one-shot game 
was apparent even in the first round of play in each condition. Children thus recognized that the fact of 
future interactions with the same partner presented greater opportunities for cooperation, the so-called 
shadow of the future. Importantly, children remained anonymous to each other during the experiment, 
allowing us to isolate the role of direct reciprocity in strategic decisions. This stands in contrast to prior 
games in which children could identify each other, raising the possibility that concerns about reputation 
outside of the game context and personal history with the partner had influenced decisions.
This study also demonstrates that children as young as 10 years of age engage in conditional strategies 
of cooperation in the repeated PD. Prior experiments have found little evidence of conditional coopera-
tion in PDs with children. For example, in a multiple-player social dilemma (Public Goods Game), 10 to 
16 year olds did not respond reciprocally to their partner’s decision; most notably, cooperation did not 
increase after mutual cooperation28. The current study adds to these results by demonstrating that in an 
anonymous, dyadic, repeated PD children do use conditional strategies, cooperating most after mutual 
cooperation and least after they cooperated and the partner defected in the prior round, leading to the 
lowest payoff to the child. This may be due in part to the fact that direct reciprocity can successfully 
Figure 5. Different conditional strategies by sub-group. Shown is the frequency of cooperation in repeated 
games as a function of the actor’s and the partner’s decision in the previous round. Strategies varied by 
gender (a) and conduct problem group (b). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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maintain cooperation in dyadic relationships, whereas in multiplayer games, even among adults, coop-
eration tends to decrease over time40.
Importantly, the conditional strategies used by children varied based on two individual character-
istics: gender and conduct problems. Girls were generally more cooperative than boys and were more 
likely to cooperate after they had defected in the prior round. What factors underlie this difference in 
behavior remains an open question. To some extent, children may have been responding to either the 
expected or actual behavior of partners of the same gender. In most of the repeated games girls played 
girls and boys played boys, and the children knew this before starting the game. However, there was one 
repeated game in which the partner could be either the same or opposite gender, and children used the 
same strategies as in the single gender games. This suggests that the strategies used by girls and boys may 
be stable across different kinds of partners and that girls may be genuinely more forgiving of defection. 
However, caution is warranted in interpreting this result due to the small sample size and the relatively 
small number of boys in the sample. In addition, gender differences in children’s prosocial behavior vary 
across studies and tasks and often fail to replicate41. Thus, replication studies are needed to ensure that 
the gender differences in strategies are stable and, if so, to understand what cognitive and social factors 
drive the differences.
Intriguing differences also appeared for children scoring high on the conduct problems scale. Children 
who were rated by their parents as having more conduct problems tended to cooperate less in both the 
one-shot and repeated PD. For the repeated games, this subset of children was more likely to defect 
overall and used less forgiving conditional strategies that resembled Grim. The finding that children 
with different degrees of conduct problems use different strategies in the repeated PD is striking for two 
reasons. First, it shows that distinct forms of conditional cooperation have emerged by late elementary 
school for children with different behavioral profiles. Research with adults has found some evidence of 
links between personality traits and cooperation in the PD42–44, but to our knowledge no studies have 
examined children’s traits or behavioral profiles in relation to their decisions in the PD. Our results show 
that individual differences in cooperative strategies emerge much earlier than adulthood.
Second, the connection between children’s strategies in the repeated PD and their behavior outside of 
the experimental context suggest that this task can be an important tool for studying the development 
of behavioral problems. Around 10 years of age, behavioral problems increase dramatically and often 
persist into adulthood32. Different sub-types of conduct problems are evident before age 10 and problems 
manifest differently for boys and girls45. The current study thus highlights the potential for using intuitive 
versions of the repeated PD to better understand how problematic behavior emerges in complex social 
situations and what factors encourage cooperation among children with different behavioral profiles.
Although we cannot determine the exact motivations that underlie the different strategies used by 
children with conduct problems, prior studies offer some insight. For example, one study used a one-shot 
Trust Game with a group of children clinically diagnosed with conduct disorder31. In this task, an inves-
tor must decide how many points to pass to a trustee; the points are tripled (in this case) and then the 
trustee decides how many points to send back to the investor. Children with conduct problems in the 
investor role tended to send less to the trustee compared to children without problems, demonstrating 
low trust. In addition, in the trustee role, the clinical group sent less back to the investor compared to the 
control group, demonstrating low trustworthiness. When asked to explain their decisions, children with 
conduct problems often referred to mistrust of the partner or their perception that the partner’s decision 
was hostile. Thus, in the current study, the low rates of cooperation and forgiveness among children with 
conduct problems may have been due to a general mistrust of their partners.
In summary, the current study makes two key contributions. First, we demonstrate that children as 
young as 10 years of age take advantage of the potential for direct reciprocity to enhance cooperation in 
the prisoner’s dilemma. When repeated interactions are possible, children engage in conditional coop-
eration, even though the interactions are anonymous. Thus, by late elementary school children already 
possess the cognitive capacities necessary for strategic cooperation in a complex social dilemma. Second, 
we find that the particular strategies used by children vary based on their gender and by their behavior 
in the world outside of the experiment. This latter finding has potentially important policy implications. 
If teachers are interested in promoting cooperation within the classroom, different approaches may be 
needed for girls and boys and for children with behavioral problems in particular. In addition, given that 
children with conduct problems show distinct patterns of play in the repeated PD, this task may prove 
an important tool for future study of the psychological mechanisms that lead to lower cooperation in 
this group.
Materials and Methods
We tested 5th and 6th graders recruited from a US elementary school. The school site was selected because 
it is a science and technology charter school in which children gain experience using computers as early 
as the first grade. The school had fleets of laptop computers that could be rolled into each classroom 
and a wireless network that could support the online game. These features allowed us to test children 
within their school.
The overall mean age was 11.6 years and the age range was 9.75–13.33 years. One sixth grader miss-
ing age data was assigned the mean age for the grade. The school’s mission is to serve minority children 
and while only 60% of parents provided demographic information, 80% of those responding described 
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themselves as Black or African-American. Roughly half of the parents had completed some college and 
the median household income was $42,000. Parental consent was obtained in writing and child assent 
was obtained the day of the experiment. All consent and experimental procedures were approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at Harvard University (IRB #F20073). The methods were carried out in 
accordance with the approved guidelines.
Experiments were conducted using a standard computerized version of the PD (www.econvision.
com) with a novel interface for children (Fig. 1). In the one-shot version of the game, children played a 
series of one shot games (mean # trials = 26) and in the repeated version they played a series of 6-round, 
fixed length games (mean # trials = 30; median # games = 5). In all classrooms, we ran as many games 
as time would allow which lead to the difference in the mean number of trials between the one shot and 
the repeated games. To address concerns that this difference can explain the differences between the one 
shot and repeated games, we re-ran all of the analyses comparing the two games using only the first 24 
trials of each game. This subset analysis did not materially change the results.
Three 5th grade and two 6th grade classrooms were tested. The first classroom tested was randomly 
assigned, by a coin flip, to receive either the repeated PD or the one-shot PD. The next classroom for 
each grade played the other game; the third 5th grade class received another repeated game. Within each 
classroom, boys and girls played separate games: boys played with boys and girls played with girls, and 
the children were told that this was the case. In the third 5th grade repeated game, we conducted a mixed 
gender game due to a smaller number of participants. Adding this factor to our regressions did not 
produce different results. (See Table 1 for final sample size by gender and game). Children used laptop 
computers while sitting at their regular desks with cardboard barriers added to create cubicles to reduce 
interactions outside of the games; partners remained anonymous in all games.
The interface showed two hands, one for each player, that could either push or pull a tray (Fig.  1). 
Clicking a Push button delivered three coins to the partner (Cooperate) and clicking the Pull button 
delivered one coin to themselves (Defect). This created a payoff matrix of DD = 1, CD = 0, DC = 4, 
and CC = 3 (Table  2). Decisions were made simultaneously, and the trays moved after both children 
had made their decision. Payoffs to each player for each round were visible on a side bar. To ensure 
comprehension, a cartoon video described the characteristics of the game, comprehension checks were 
performed and practice trials were conducted prior to the start of the experiment (for full procedure see 
Supporting Information).
To incentivize children, we told them that the total points they earned during the study could be used 
to “purchase” prizes from the experimenters the following week. Children were shown several prizes that 
would be available, and it was emphasized that with more points they could acquire more and better 
prizes. The prize purchase day occurred about one week after the testing session for each classroom.
To measure children’s behavioral problems we used a standard parent report questionnaire, the 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1994, 1997) (see Table S1 for full ques-
tionnaire). The SDQ consists of 25 questions that assess five constructs of child behavior: Prosociality, 
Conduct Problems, Emotional Problems, Hyperactivity and Peer Problems. This instrument is widely 
used to screen for childhood psychopathology. The SDQ was sent home to parents along with the con-
sent forms. Fifty-eight parents completed the SDQ (91%).
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